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Law and the Indochina War: 
A Retrospective View*
Edwin Brown Firmage**
We are mad, not only individually, but nationally. We check man­
slaughter and isolated murders; but what of war and the much vaunted 
crime of slaughtering whole peoples?
Seneca: Ad Lucilim XCV.
How small, of all that human hearts endure,
That part which laws or Kings can cause or cure.
Oliver Goldsmith: The Traveller
I .  I n t r o d u c t io n
This century, from the Hague Conferences through the Vietnam War, 
has seen a profound change in attitudes toward the role of law as a con­
straint upon foreign policy. The Hague Conferences1 represented at once 
an attempt, however feeble, by men of mixed motives to emplace fledgling 
prophylactic legal institutions upon the tendencies of the nation-states to 
resolve disputes by war, and at the same time to limit war’s destructive­
ness if prevention failed. World War I destroyed not only most of this 
superstructure, but also massive portions of the more fundamental in­
stitutions of the dynastic state system of the time. When European balance 
of power politics failed to maintain peace and preserve social order, the 
ad hoc systems of the Hague Conventions were replaced by the League of 
Nations, which provided a weak form of collective security and a stand­
ing conference system of dispute resolution.
The controversy in this country over our participation in the League 
of Nations was not merely a debate between advocates of the geopolitics 
of power and proponents of a stronger role for legal institutions in inter­
national relations. Both proponents and opponents of the League rec­
ognized the need for development of dispute resolution institutions to dis­
place balance of power politics in the maintenance of peace. Woodrow 
Wilson favored the League for precisely the same reason that Philander
* This Article was prepared for the American Society of International Law Panel 
on the Role of International Law in Civil Wars and will be reprinted in volume four 
of The Vietnam War and International Law, edited by Richard Falk and published 
by Princeton Press.
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1 See Firmage, Fact-Finding in the Resolution of International Disputes —  From 
the Hague Peace Conference to the United Nations, 1971 U t a h  L. R e v . 421 (an 
analysis of the evolution of fact-finding, peace-keeping, and dispute resolution techni­
ques through the media of the Hague Conference, the League of Nations, the Bryan 
treaties, and the United Nations).
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Knox, Senator Borah, and J. Reuben Clark, Jr.,3 opposed it; all were 
reacting against European balance of power politics. Wilson viewed the 
League system as the way to conduct foreign policy on a foundation of 
collective security, if not parliamentary politics. Knox, Clark, and others 
saw the League —  inextricably tied to the Versailles settlement as the 
price Wilson paid for the world body —  simply as an institutional means 
by which France and Britain might maintain a dominant position over 
Germany. In their view, the League amounted to European power politics 
in institutional disguise. Clark, far from opposing the concept of a standing 
conference system as a means of dispute resolution, proposed such a plan 
of his own.3 The arbitration treaties of William Jennings Bryan, our parti­
cipation in the Permanent Court of International Justice supported by 
Harding, the Kellogg-Biiand Pact (defended by proponents and op­
ponents of the League), the reliance upon arbitration as a means of dis­
pute resolution by Elihu Root, Charles Evans Hughes, and J. Reuben 
Clark, Jr., and the disarmament conferences (sustained by leading pro­
ponents and opponents of the League) represent some degree of support 
for a legal or institutional approach to foreign policy —  an approach 
excoriated by Acheson,4 Kennan, and others after World War II.
Kennan’s book, consisting of lectures delivered at the University of 
Chicago in 1951, became one of the most popular and influential writings 
on foreign policy. His criticism of excessive legalism in foreign policy was 
based upon his examination of American foreign policy from the Civil 
War to World War I I :
. . .  I see the most serious fault of our past policy formulation to lie 
in something that I might call the legalistic-moralistic approach to 
international problems.. . .
It is the belief that it should be possible to suppress the chaotic 
and dangerous aspirations of governments in the international field 
by the acceptance of some system of legal rules and restraints. This 
belief undoubtedly represents in part an attempt to transpose the 
Anglo-Saxon concept of individual law into the international field
3 See Firmage & Blakesley, J. Reuben Clark, Jr.: Law and International Order, in 
J. R e u b e n  C l a r k , J r . —  D ip l o m a t  a n d  St a t e s m a n  43, 54 et seq. (R .  Hillam ed. 
1973).
3 See id. at 61-62 & n.46, citing Clark, System of Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes: A Program, U n it y  (Oct. 4, 1923). Clark proposed that there be created 
a world judiciary and world deliberative body, with quasi-legislative functions, which he 
called a “World Congress.” Id. at 61.
* Mr. George Kennan complains, I think justly, of the disservice which lawyer 
secretaries of state did to American foreign policy during the years when they 
directed most of our effort to the negotiation of nearly a hundred treaties of 
arbitration, only two of which were ever invoked. He is, of course, quite right 
that all this misguided effort sprang from a complete failure to see the 
enormous threat to world stability which the Germans were so soon to carry 
into action. Even after the First World War, the realities of power were still 
obscured to us by our peculiar American belief that salvation lies in institu­
tional mechanisms.
D. A c h e s o n , M o r n in g  a n d  N o o n  147 (1965). See also Acheson, The Arrogance of 
International Lawyers, 2 I n t ’ l  L a w y e r  591 (1968); McDougal & Reisman, Rhodesia 
and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern, 62 Am. J. I n t ’ l  L .
1 (1968).
H e i n O n l i n e  -- 1 9 7 4  U t a h  L. R e v .  2 1 9 7 4
Spr ing ] LAW AND THE INDOCHINA WAR 3
and to make it applicable to governments as it is applicable . . .  to 
individuals.5
Elaborating upon these early observations, Kennan in his memoirs 
described our foreign policy between 1865 and 1939 as “ utopian in its 
expectations, legalistic in its concept of methodology, moralistic in the 
demands it seemed to place on others, and self-righteous in the degree of 
high-mindedness and rectitude it imputed to ourselves.”  6 He also criticized 
our •
inordinate preoccupation with arbitration treaties, the efforts towards 
world disarmament, the attempt to outlaw war by the simple verbiage 
of the Kellogg Pact, and illusions about the possibilities of achieving a 
peaceful world through international organization and multilateral 
diplomacy, as illustrated in the hopes addressed to the League of 
Nations and the United Nations.7
Kennan’s penetrating criticism of our legalistic, institutional approach 
to foreign policy during the century preceding World War II was far 
more than a simple commentary on the limitations of one trained in the 
law to serve as Secretary of State. Rather, Kennan indicated an entire 
approach to foreign policy,8 an approach shared not only by lawyers, but 
also by political scientists and historians, presidents and their advisors, 
and proponents and opponents of the League. T o Kennan, this approach 
ignored the inevitable role of power in politics.
The conception of law in international life should certainly receive 
every support and encouragement that our country can give it  But it 
cannot yet replace power as the vital force for a large part of the 
world. And the realities of power will soon seep into any legalistic 
structure which we erect to govern international life. They will per­
meate it. They will become the content of it; and the structure will
s G. K e n n a n , A m e r ic a n  D ip l o m a c y  1900-1950, at 95-96 (1951).
0 G. K e n n a n , M e m o ir s  : 1950-1963, at 71 (1972).
'Id.
8 Kennan recorded in 1944 his reaction to the press reports of the Dumbarton Oaks 
discussions:
Underlying the whole conception of an organization for international 
security is the simple reasoning that if only the status quo could be rigidly 
preserved, there could be no further wars in Europe, and the European 
problem, as far as our country is concerned, would be solved. This reasoning, ’ 
which mistakes die symptoms for the disease, is not new. It underlay the Holy 
Alliance, the League of Nations, and numerous other political structures set 
up by nations which were, for the moment, satisfied with the international 
setup and did not wish to see it changed. These structures have always served 
the purpose for which they were designed just so long as the interests of the 
great powers gave substance and reality to their existence. The moment this 
situation changed, the moment it became in the interests of one or the other 
of the great powers to alter the status quo, none of these treaty structures 
ever stood in the way of such alteration. _
International political life is something organic, not something mechanical.
'Its pggftnrj* is change; and the only systems for the regulation of international 
life which can be effective over long periods of time are ones sufficiently subtle, 
sufficiently pliable, to adjust themselves to constant change in the interests 
and power of the various countries involved.
G. K e n n a n , M e m o ir s : 1925-1950, at 218 (1967).
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remain only the form. International security will depend on th em : 
on the realities of power — not on the structure in which they are 
clothed. We are being almost criminally negligent of the interests of 
our people if we allow our plans for an international organization to 
be an excuse for failing to occupy ourselves seriously and minutely 
with the sheer power relationships of the European peoples.9
The League’s ultimate failure10 to meet the challenge of the aggressor 
states in the 1930’s, although in part due to its inherent institutional weak­
ness, was more basically due to the failure of traditional balance of power 
diplomacy. The seeds of World War II were clearly sown at Versailles; the 
blame for the inability of the League to prevent the harvest must also 
be bome by those European states that refused to support the League at 
critical points and by the United States, which refused to participate. 
Basic power remained within the states, and they continued to make 
fundamental decisions that were translated by traditional means into 
action within the international sphere. In other words, the debacle of 
World War II represents not only a failure of legal institutions, but also 
the more basic failure of traditional balance of power diplomacy.
The United Nations and the League are alike in that both have had 
impressive success in preventing certain types of violence and in restoring 
and maintaining at least a short lived peace between belligerents, while 
both have had very little success in resolving the underlying causes of such 
violence.11 Senator Fulbright, however, argues that the United Nations 
has not failed, because it has never been tried.12 Certainly we retreated 
with undue and perhaps tragic haste from initial attempts to use this 
institution in the place of traditional alliance diplomacy.13 Nevertheless,
9 Id, at 218-19.
10 Critics of the League of Nations often overlook its substantial achievements in 
maintaining the peace for over a decade after World War I, during which time the 
European map was redrawn. On at least one occasion, the League performed a crucial 
role in preventing a Balkan conflagration that could well have resulted in a European 
or world-wide war. See Firmage, supra note 1. _
The dispute of Albania against Yugoslavia and Greece in 1921 might well 
have resulted in substantial territorial losses, if not the disappearance of Al­
bania, but for the actions of the Council of the League and its commission of 
inquiry which helped to establish the Albanian government and to settle that 
state’s frontiers. Again, the Demir-Kapu frontier dispute between Greece and 
Bulgaria in 1925 might well have resulted in another Balkan war but for the 
forceful demands of Aristide Briand, President of the Council of the League. 
Greece, prepared to invade Bulgarian territory, pulled back after reception 
of Briand’s telegram demanding that neither side resort to war. A commission 
of inquiry sponsored by the Council was later instrumental in settling the 
dispute. The eventual failure of the League has made it all too possible to 
forget its impressive successes in dealing with disputes of lesser magnitude 
than Manchuria or Spain, but still quite sufficient to have resulted in war in 
the absence of effective regimes of settlement.
Firmage, Book Review, 1972 A m . P o l . Sgi. R e v . 1088.
11 For analysis of fact-finding and peace-keeping efforts by the United Nations see 
Firmage, supra note 1, at 432 et seq.
“  Address by William Fulbright before the Pacem in Terris III Conference, Oct. 
8, 1973, in 119 C o n g . R e c . 18,830 (daily ed. Oct 9, 1973).
13 It is interesting to note that the current revisionist writing on the origins of the 
Cold War, coming in part from the New Left, was preceded by twenty years not only 
by the Old Left, epitomized by Henry Wallace, but also by the Old Right. J. Reuben
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it is begging the question to assert that the United Nations —  and the 
entire institutional approach to foreign policy that it represents —  has 
not failed because it has never been used. Such an assertion must be 
followed by an inquiry into the reasons why the powerful nations have 
not used the United Nations as the primary vehicle for accomplishing 
their goals.
Beginning with the Gold War and the creation of NATO, and con­
tinuing in some degree until late 1972, when the United States ended its 
participation in the Vietnam War, the world has been gripped by an 
ideological struggle, the ferocity of which has not been matched since the 
Wais of Religion. This struggle has frozen international politics into a bi­
polar structure that has prevented the application of either traditional 
balance of power diplomacy or its more sophisticated alternative, legal 
institutionalism. The watershed years in international relations, beginning 
in the late sixties and extending to the present, have brought the op­
portunity for another beginning. As in 1815, 1918, and 1945, we now 
must reexamine the international community and the means by which 
its roots may be deepened. This Article will focus on the contributions 
that law —  both municipal and international —  can realistically make 
toward attaining the goal of a world community governed more by law 
and less by force.
II. L e g a l O b lig a t io n  and Com m unity
In evaluating the role of law in foreign affairs, a critical examination 
of Kerman’s indictment of excessive legalism may be appropriate. Kennan 
perceived a relationship between a community and its institutions that 
determines the effectiveness of legal obligation. He therefore distrusted 
attempts by institutionalists to transplant the legal structure of a hier­
archically ordered municipal system based upon a mature and somewhat 
homogeneous community into the highly decentralized and heterogeneous 
international community.
Kennan’s criticism, however, ignored the mutual cause and effect rela­
tionship between a community and its institutions. That is, although a
Clark, Jr., a conservative Republican who served as Solicitor of the Department of 
State under Hoover and who adamantly opposed our participation in both the League 
and the United Nations, also opposed the creation of NATO and the polarization of 
the world into opposing armed camps which it represented:
“ It would hardly do to form an open alliance against Russia; and both 
Britain and ourselves should be wary of an alliance with her. So the device 
is conceived as a ‘union’ of states, which, however, would tie the nations 
together more securely than an alliance and be a greater threat to Russia.
“But such an alliance would lead, and such a ‘union’ will lead, sooner or 
later, to a counter-alliance by the other nations that would challenge the power 
of such a ‘union,’ so meaning either constant war for supremacy or a war 
of absolute conquest by the one or the other and a consequent enslavement of 
the conquered. Peace without liberty spells a stalemate in civilization and 
spiritual development. “Union now* has far more ill than good in it. Nor 
must America ever become a party to an attempted military domination of 
the world.”
Quoted in Firmage & Blakesley, supra note 2, at 56.
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certain critical mass of “ community-ness”  must exist before a legal struc­
ture will naturally emerge and be accepted as obligatory, legal institution 
may profoundly change and deepen community ties through its accom­
modation of successful experiences. The lesson then is not that we draft 
a utopian world constitution and invite the world to ratify and accede, 
but rather that we perceive embryonic legal institutions within the inter­
national system as possible contributors to the development of an emerg­
ing international community.
Ascertaining the relationship between power, morality, law, and 
community begins with an analysis of the nature of legal obligation. Pro­
ponents of Natural Law maintain that legal obligation can be objectively 
derived from the principles of justice; in contrast, Positivists focus on the 
role of the sovereign state, rather than the principles of justice, in formulat­
ing legal obligation. Our recent preoccupation with institutional systems 
and disregard of moral principles as constraints on sovereign authority 
reflect a theoretical dependence upon the tenets of Positivism. Although 
Natural Law is theoretically deficient because it fails properly to consider 
the role of power in developing legal obligation, Positivism is equally de­
ficient because it is excessively preoccupied with the same. Accordingly, 
a return to Naturalist considerations, tempered by Positivist realism, may 
contribute substantially to the effectiveness of law in accomplishing inter­
national peace.
John Rawls recently stated in a neo-Naturalist thesis14 that legal obliga­
tion first arises from a disposition to support efforts to improve social 
interaction through fair laws and fair institutional procedures.15 Thus, 
although institutions might reinforce legal obligations and even create 
legal duties pursuant to fair procedures, the content of the law would 
forever remain the primary source of obligation. According to Naturalist 
theory, one may be obligated conscientiously to object to or civilly disobey 
laws dictated by the formal institutions, where such laws violate the pri­
mary principles of justice or are enacted in violation of fair procedures.10 
Thus, the Naturalist conception of law as voluntarily obligatory lends 
itself well to the international sphere, since institutional systems are often 
incapable of enforcing legal rules without voluntary compliance.
Positivists, in contrast, reject any objective constraints, such as principles 
of fairness, upon the sovereign’s authority to make law. Although the 
sovereign may consent to being obligated —  both internally by constitu­
tional constraints and externally by treaties and voluntary participation 
in international institutions •— such obligation, being self-imposed, need 
not be based on any principles of justice or fairness. Thus, Positivists con­
tend that adherence to law in the international sphere is discretionary 
with the sovereign. Their reliance in foreign affairs on power politics,
14 J . R a w l s ,  A T h e o r y  o f  J u s t i c e  (1971).
15 Id. at 11-17.
16 Id. at 371-82.
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rather than objective legal norms, grows out of this contention. Legal 
realists in this country, including the McDouglas school of thought, urge 
that legal institutions should be manipulatively used to promote national 
interests in international affairs. So interpreted, law is mere superstructure 
controlled by the power forces of the state. Thus, where states are ideolo­
gically opposed, law can provide at best a temporary truce, but it cannot 
establish ultimate peace.
Although adherence to either the Naturalist or the Positivist theory of 
obligation can assist in achieving international order, reliance on either 
theory in isolation may ultimately be reactionary. For example, the Posi­
tivists’ excessive reliance on institutions partially justified a reversion to 
power politics when the institutions seemingly failed. Had the Positivists 
better understood the limited role that formal structure plays in the devel­
opment of legal obligation, then the partial success of the institutions could 
have been appreciated and their ultimate inadequacy anticipated.
Thus, our earlier mistake was optimistically to assume that a complex 
superstructure sitting uncomfortably atop an embryonic community could 
resolve fundamental intracommunity conflicts. But Kennan’s blanket in­
dictment of the institutional approach to foreign policy, based on the 
weaknesses inherent in the early development of international institutions, 
also missed the mark. The problem was not that legal institutions were 
wholly ineffective, but only that they were not totally adequate. Further, 
nascent existence and use of legal institutions, even at first limited to peri­
pheral international problems, would have been helpful in developing a 
community of greater depth, which might in turn have supported yet 
stronger institutions.
An institutional approach to foreign policy must begin with a proper 
assessment of the level of community that exists within the international 
system and the corresponding capacity of community members voluntarily 
to accept as obligatory rules emanating from community institutions. 
Stated differently, experience suggests that legal institutions absent the re­
quisite foundation of community cannot yield world peace.
Yet there is nothing inherent in man’s nature, nor in his cultural or 
national divisions, that precludes the development of a communal base 
sufficient to support a legitimate normative order. It is suggested that there 
exist as innate propensities within man a sense of fairness and a sense of 
community, which in combination provide a base sufficient to support a 
universal normative structure. Further, if law is to be obligatory, it is sug­
gested that any legal system must accommodate this normative structure, 
at least to a minimal extent; thus, this normative structure would perform 
a critical role in maintaining both internal and external peace among 
sovereign states. This theory is impliedly supported by recent research in 
language learning by Noam Chomsky, by studies of moral development 
by psychologists Lawrence Kohlberg and June Tapp, and by research 
in comparative law by Rudolph Schlesinger.
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Chomsky’s research in language learning suggests that there exists in 
man an unconscious knowledge of innate principles of universal gram­
mar, This innate mental structure allows successful experience to confirm 
a prior disposition “that there is a primitive, neurologically given analytic 
system which may degenerate if not stimulated at an appropriate critical 
period, but which otherwise provides a specific interpretation of experi­
ence . . . 17
Thus, contrary to radical empiricism, which rejects the theory of innate 
forms of knowledge, Chomsky theorizes a system of belief not entirely de­
pendent on environmental circumstances, but instead erected upon in­
nate principles of mind: “A system of knowledge and belief results from 
the interplay of innate mechanisms, genetically determined maturational 
processes, and interaction with the social and physical environment.”  18 
Extrapolated to a theory of law, Chomsky’s theory suggests that legal rules 
are possibly constructed on the basis of distinct innate schemata, or a 
universal normative structure, much like the universal structure of 
language.19 Indeed, both the uniformity of legal principles and the regu­
larity with which people accept rules of social interaction as obligatory 
are inconsistent with the empiricist’s view that obligation arises from ex­
perience. Thus, abstract normative principles may be inherent in human 
nature and may impose limits on what the mind will accept as legally 
obligatory.
The notion that there may be innate principles of mind that determine 
a universal normative structure should be no surprise to students of com­
parative law. The concept of Jus Gentium —  principles of law common 
to all nations by virtue of their being intrinsically consonant with right 
reason —  existed historically under Roman law and survives today in 
article 3 8 ( l ) ( c )  of the statute of the International Court of Justice. 
“These ‘general principles of law’ are n o t . . . peculiar to any legal system 
but are inherent in, and common to, them all. They constitute the com­
mon foundation of every system of law.”  20
Rudolph Schlesinger, in the Cornell Project,21 recently attempted to 
define the “ common core” of legal principles. Although the scope of
11N . C h o m s k y ,  P r o b l e m s  o f  K n o w l e d g e  a n d  F r e e d o m : T h e  R u s s e l l  L e c ­
t u r e s  13 (1971).
18 Id. at 21.
19 Although Chomsky’s investigation is presently limited to language, he suggests 
an investigation of other systems of belief as a natural further step: “ I see no reason 
why other domains of human intelligence might not be amenable to such investigation. 
Perhaps, in this way, we can characterize the structure of various systems of human 
knowledge and belief, various systems of performance and interaction.” Id. at 47.
23 Jalet, The Quest for the General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Na­
tions —  A Study, 10 U.C.L.A.L. R e v . 1041 (1963), quoting Cheng, The Meaning 
and Scope of Article 38(1 ) ( c )  of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in 
38 G r o t iu s  S o c i e t y : T r a n s a c t i o n s  f o r  t h e  Y e a r  1952, at 125, 129 (1953).
21 Financed by a grant from the Ford Foundation, the purpose of the Project as 
initially formulated was to determine “whether there are, in fact, any basic ‘core’ legal 
principles of private law generally recognized by civilized nations.” Davis, Comparative 
Law Contributions to the International Legal Order: Common Core Research, 37 
G e o . W a s h . L .  R e v . 615, 616 (1969).
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research was limited to contract law, the noticeable uniformity of contract 
principles discovered by the research supports the theory of a universal 
normative structure. Although legal realists have criticized the theory of 
common core research, their criticism has focused on the alleged pointless­
ness of discovering common core principles, not upon the fact of their 
existence.22
Further support for a universal normative structure theory is found in 
recent research by psychologists Kohlberg and Tapp. Their national, cross­
national, and cross-cultural studies of the effects of moral and legal 
attitudes on behavior suggest that moral and legal development toward 
order and justice follows a universal sequence of distinct stages.23 Kohl- 
berg’s research indicates that “ [t]he development of moral thought follows 
a universal sequence of distinct stages.”  24 Similarly, Tapp’s research re­
lates legal concepts to Kohlberg’s moral levels.
Kohlberg’s studies identify three general levels of moral judgment and 
two intermediate stages within each level. At level I, the “Preconventional 
Level,”  man interprets moral labels in terms of physical consequences. At 
the “ Physical Power”  stage of level I, superior power or prestige deter­
mines morality in terms of physical consequences. At the “ Instrumental 
Relativism”  stage of level I, moral acts are hedonistically characterized 
in terms of satisfying one’s own needs; equitable considerations are 
present, but they are interpreted pragmatically. At level II, the “ Con­
ventional Level,”  morality is characterized by active support of the status 
quo. At the “ Interpersonal Concordance”  stage of level II, conformity to 
majority behavior determines morality. At the “ Law and Order”  stage of 
level II, one’s moral duty is to obey fixed rules to maintain the given 
social order. Level III, the “Post Conventional”  level, is marked by the 
appearance of autonomous moral principles. At the “Social Contract” 
stage of level III, morality is determined in terms of individual rights 
agreed upon by the society in the form of a hypothetical constitution. In 
this stage, procedural rules for reaching consensus opinions are critical, 
and possibility of social change is determined by social utility. The “Uni­
versal Ethic”  stage of level III is characterized by universal, consistent,
“ Even, if comprehensive impressions of commonly accepted positive legal 
principles, attitudes and consistencies of decision making were somehow 
reduced to a manageable common denominator of core premises arguably 
constituting an extranational common law of mankind, the fabric of this law 
is so easily rent or so clearly vulnerable to unretributable alteration, change 
or even obliteration by those exercising raw political power within the 
territories of national enclaves that such a comprehensive project would be 
manifestly pointless.
Id. at 626.
“ Kohlberg & Tapp, Developing Senses of Law and Legal JusticeJ 27 J. Soc. I s s u e s  
at 89 (1971). The theoretical bases for Kohlberg’s model are represented by John 
Dewey’s genetic, experiential, and purposive reasoning (1910, 1916, and 1930), Jean 
Piaget’s structural approach to moral development and cognitive thought (1928, 1929, 
and 1932), and Immanuel Kant’s ethical analysis (1849). Id. at 67.
M Id. at 67.
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and comprehensive moral decisions. Individual ethical principles pre­
vail.25
Tapp’s levels of legal development, which correspond to Kohlberg’s 
levels of moral development, progress from prohibitive laws supported by 
threat of punishment, to prescriptive or neutral regulatory laws supported 
by vested interests, to rationally, beneficial laws supported by principled 
obedience.26
The implications of the Tapp and Kohlberg studies are that a universal 
normative structure exists and that movement toward full realization of 
that structure contributes to peace and justice within the community. 
Movement between stages, however, follows an incremental pattern re­
quiring stimulation and assimilation, and the absence of either element 
tends to retard or even arrest community development to higher levels. 
To facilitate growth, therefore, the stimulator must encourage “ [e]xperi- 
ence-based activity involving conflict resolution, problem solving and 
participation in decision making,” all of which promote voluntary com­
pliance through perfecting a sense of responsibility, obligation, and justice. 
Tapp and Kohlberg observe:
The match problem for affecting change in legal development is one 
of presenting stimuli sufficiently incongruous to stimulate conflict in the 
individual’s cognitive schema, and sufficiendy congruous to be as­
similated with some accommodative effort.27
The relevance to the international sphere of data relating to the norma­
tive development of the individual obviously raises complex questions; 
nevertheless, several hypotheses will be suggested. The first hypothesis is 
that the individuals who ultimately are affected and bound by decisions, 
including the decision-makers themselves, must be willing to live with the 
results; this is not to say that the individuals who participate in the 
decision-making process can develop a corporate legal conscience through 
corporate experiences in conflict resolution. Rather, the degree to which 
the individuals have developed their legal consciousness bears directly on 
what decisions they will accept as obligatory. The second hypothesis is 
that the level of legal consciousness which the individual decision-makers 
have accommodated will necessarily limit the alternatives for decision 
available to them. Furthermore, the bounds of the alternatives certainly 
must be circumscribed by the limits that the participants are willing to 
accept. It follows that institutional structures and individual legal con­
sciousness can reinforce each other in the accomplishment of peace.
The interplay between institutional structures and individual legal con­
sciousness can contribute to international peace and justice in at least four 
areas. First, the degree to which a government conforms to its own legal 
constraints, constitutional or otherwise, bears direcdy on international
23 Id. at 73-77. 
™Id. at 84. 
” ld. at 87.
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peace. Second, the degree to which the government’s decisional processes 
conform to international legal constraints also affects international order. 
Third, the extent to which a government promotes and sustains inter­
national institutions contributes to international order. Fourth, the level of 
legal consciousness attained by the world public actually constrains govern­
ments that would otherwise act contrary to international order.
A government’s strict compliance with its own laws contributes to inter­
national order in several ways: (1) A  government that has incorporated 
international law into its own civil or common law is obligated to inter­
national order by its own legal structure, apart from international con­
straints. (2) A  state must habitually obey its domestic legal constraints be­
fore it can successfully accommodate international legal principles. A 
government, for example, that disregards its own legal procedures will 
likely act similarly in its relations with other states. Accordingly, strict com­
pliance with domestic constitutional procedures benefits not only domestic 
order, but also international order, and vice versa. A  comparison of our 
government’s conduct in the Watergate affair and its unconstitutional acts 
in Indochina supports this proposition.28
This concept should not be viewed solely through the glasses of Western 
liberal thought. It is not asserted that progressive democratic societies will 
be peaceful and totalitarian states will be war-like; rather, it is asserted 
that states, regardless of their ideology, that adhere to internal legal con­
straints and abide their own rules of municipal order are less likely to 
violate international norms; conversely, violation of international norms 
may similarly predispose a government to violate municipal law.
The extent to whicli a government’s formal decision-making machinery 
operates under international legal constraints necessarily affects interna­
tional order. For example, efforts in establishing treaties and regulating 
conflicts between international actors substantially aid in preserving inter­
national order, notwithstanding the rationalist power politics theory to 
the contrary. Abram Chayes recognizes this view in an analysis of the 
working of arms control agreements.29 Chayes asserts that the bureaucratic 
inertia of perpetuating and maintaining “organizational health . . .  in 
terms of bodies assigned and dollars appropriated”  30 can be channelled 
in a normative direction by the processes of treaty negotiation and ratifica­
tion.31
** Our participation in the Vietnam War was initiated and later maintained in viola­
tion of both constitutional and international law. In turn, later violations of municipal 
and constitutional law, known generically as Watergate, were in part caused by factors 
stemming from our involvement in Vietnam.
89 Chayes, An Inquiry into the Workings of Arms Control Agreements, 85 H arv. L. 
Rev. 905 (1972).
80Id. at 916, quoting G. A l l i s o n ,  E s s e n c e  o f  D e c i s i o n : E x p l a i n i n g  t e e  C u b a n  
M i s s i l e  C r is i s  82 (1971).
31 pTJhis very process of negotiation and ratification tends to generate powerful 
pressures for compliance, if and when the treaty is adopted. At least three 
interrelated phenomena contribute to these pressures: (1) by the time the 
treaty is adopted, a broad consensus within governmental and political circles
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International institutions may substantially contribute to international 
order both by successfully resolving conflicts and by stimulating interna­
tional community growth. Although Kennan’s criticism of excessive in­
stitutionalism possesses penetrating insight, the growth of supemational 
entities has rendered his criticism increasingly less valid and more reac­
tionary. Institutional structure, however, cannot replace a lack of consensus 
on critical issues. Obligations arising out of supra-national institutions will 
be binding only insofar as they comport with the level of legal develop­
ment achieved by the participating states.
Finally, the growing consciousness of the universality of human ex­
perience contributes to the development of law and peace:
There is a new realism emerging out of the need to adapt the state 
system to the multiple challenges of war, population pressure, global 
pollution, resource depletion, and human alienation. It is this new 
political consciousness that insists upon regarding America’s involve­
ment in the Indochina War as illegal and immoral from the begin­
ning . . . ,32
Our involvement in the Vietnam War offers an excellent vehicle for a 
detailed analysis of the significance to international peace and justice of 
governmental adherence to constitutional and international laws.
A. Vietnam and Constitutionalism
This country, along with other states, can influence the growth of legal 
consciousness by force of example; a particularly potent example would 
be a return to the basic precepts of our own charter, thereby fostering an 
understanding of constitutionalism. Those exercising sovereign preroga­
tives are considered to be circumscribed by leges imperii —  the laws of 
government. These laws normally antedate the exercise of sovereign power 
and determine the identity and the limits of persons that exercise such 
power. Contrary to those who perceive from the Vietnam experience a 
failure of our constitutional structure and the accompanying need for a 
convention to produce a new constitutional document,33 it would seem at 
once more sound and more attainable to return to the basic prescriptions 
of the Constitution. Detailed analyses of the constitutional implications of 
our Vietnam involvement have been accomplished34 and will not be re­
will be arrayed in support of the decision; (2) meanwhile, principal centers 
of potential continuing opposition will have been neutralized or assuaged, 
though often by means of concessions that significantly modify the sub­
stance of the policy; and (3) many officials, leaders of the administration 
or regime and opponents as well, will have been personally and publicly 
committed to the treaty, creating a kind of political imperative for the success 
of the policy.
Id. at 920.
“ Falk, Nuremberg: Past, Present, and Future, 80 Y a l e  L.J. 1501, 1510-11 (1971) 
(footnote omitted).
33 R .  T u g w e l l ,  A  M o d e l  C o n s t i t u t i o n  F o r  a  U n i t e d  R e p u b l i c s  o f  A m e r ic a  
(1970).
34 Berger, War-Making by the President, 121 U . P a . L. R e v . 29 (1972); Fulbright, 
Congress, The President and the War Power, 25 A r k . L. R e v . 71 (1971); Goldwater,
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peated here; rather, only conclusions of law will be advanced. As will be 
seen, obedience to these most basic constitutional principles would at once 
restrain our own predilections toward the unlawful use of force, and 
would serve as an example to be followed by other states.
First, it is apparent that the war powers, although divided between the 
executive and the legislative branches, were deposited dominantly within 
the latter branch.35 The deliberative branch was purposely given pre­
ponderant power as a check upon the impulsive use of military force. The 
logic of James Madison is as compelling now as it was during the battle 
over the ratification of the Constitution:
Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things, be 
proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, continued 
or concluded. They are barred from the latter function by a great 
principle in free government, analogous to that which separates the 
sword from the purse, or the power of executing from the power of 
enacting laws.36
Madison further noted the axiom that “the executive is the department of 
power most distinguished by its propensity to war: hence it is the prac­
tice of all states, in proportion as they are free, to disarm this propensity 
of its influence.”  37
Thomas Jefferson also indicated his pleasure in the decision to endow 
the Congress rather than the President with the war power; he wrote to 
Madison: “ We have already given . . . one effectual check to the Dog 
of war by transferring the power of letting him loose from the Executive 
to the Legislative body, from these who are to spend to those who are to
The President’s Constitutional Primacy in Foreign Relations and National Defense, 
13 V a. J . I n t ’l . L. 463 (1973); Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The 
Original Understanding, 81 Y a l e  L.J. 672 (1972); Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad 
Law: The War Powers Act, 50 T ex. L. R ev. 833 (1972); Van Alstyne, Congress, 
The President, and the Power to Declare War: A Requiem for Vietnam, 121 U. Pa, 
L. Rev. 1 (1972); Wormuth, The Nixon Theory of the War Power: A Critique, 60 
C a l i f . L. R ev. 623 (1972).
23 Lofgren, supra note 34, at 688. Lofgren has carefully analysed the Convention, 
state ratification debates, trends in theory, and English influence. He concludes that the 
men of the day probably conceived of the President’s war-making role in exceptionally 
narrow terms. _ _ _ ^
James Wilson, perhaps the leading legal theoretician of the Convention, said:
The power of declaring war, and the other powers naturally connected with 
it, are vested in Congress. To provide and maintain a navy —  to make rules 
for its government —  to grant letters of marque and reprisal —  to make rules 
concerning captures —  to raise and support armies —  to establish rules for 
their regulation —  to provide for organizing . . . the militia, and for calling 
them forth in the service of the Union —  all these are powers naturally 
connected with the power of declaring war. All these powers, therefore, are 
vested in Congress.
1 J. W i l s o n ,  W o r k s  433 (R. McCIoskey ed. 1967).
“ Berger, supra note 34, at 39, quoting J. M a d i s o n , Letters of Helvidius, in W r it ­
i n g s  148 (G. Hunted. 1906).
37 Id. at 38, quoting 6 J. M a d i s o n , Letters of Helvidius, in W r it i n g s  138, 174 
(G. Hunt ed. 1906).
53 Fulbright, supra note 34, at 74, quoting 15 T h e  P a p e r s  o f  T h o m a s  J e f f e r s o n  
397 (J. Boyd ed. 1955).
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Congress’s powers to “provide for the common defence,”  39 to “raise and 
support armies,”  40 “to provide and maintain a navy,”  41 “ to regulate 
commerce with foreign nations,”  42 “to define and punish piracies and 
felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of 
nations,”43 to “grant letters of marque and reprisal,”  44 to “ make rules con­
cerning captures on land and water,”  45 “ to make rules for the government 
and regulation of land and naval forces,”  46 "to provide for calling forth 
the militia to execute the laws of the union,”  47 to “suppress insurrections 
and repel invasions,”  48 “to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplin­
ing the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed 
in the service of the United States,”  49 “ to make all laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers,”  50 
and, most importantly, “ to declare war,”  51 clearly leave the Executive only 
ministerial war power prerogatives, and these he may exercise only within 
parameters determined largely by Congress.
Congress’s textual grant of power to “declare war” provides, with only 
one qualification, the exclusive power to initiate war,62 whether declared 
or undeclared.53 The sole qualification upon Congress’s exclusive power
James Wilson, recognized as a proponent of a "strong Executive/’ referred to the 
“declare war” provision in ratification debates in Pennsylvania:
This system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It 
■will not be in the power of a single man . . .  to involve us in such distress; for 
the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large . . . 
from this circumstance we may draw a certain conclusion that nothing but 
our national interest can draw us into a war.
2 J. E l l i o t ,  T h e  D e b a t e s  i n  t h e  S e v e r a l  S t a t e  C o n v e n t i o n s  o n  t h e  A d o p t io n  
o f  t h e  F e d e r a l  C o n s t i t u t i o n  528 (1937).
53 U.S. C o n s t , art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
10 Id. cl. 12.
41 Id. cl. 13.
43 Id. cl. 3.
13 Id. cl. 10.
“ Id. cl. 11.
*Id .
“ Id. cl. 14-.
"Id .  cl. 15.
* Id.
• Id. cl. 16.
n Id. cl. 18.
a Id. cl. 11.
n See Wilson’s statement in 2 J. Elliot, supra note 38. Secretary of State Daniel 
Webster said (in 1851):
. . .  I have to say that the war-making power in this Government rests entirely 
with Congress; and that the President can authorize belligerent operations 
only in the cases expressly provided for by the Constitution and the laws.
By these no power is given to the Executive to oppose an attack by one in­
dependent nation on the possessions of another. . . . [I]f this interference 
be an act of hostile force, it is not within the constitutional power of the 
President. . . .
Quoted in Van Alstyne, Congress, The President, and the Power to Declare War: A 
Requiem for Vietnam, 121 U. Pa. L. R e v . 1, 11 (1972), quoting 7 D ig e s t  o f  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  L a w  163-64 (J. Moore ed. 1906).
03 The Congress possesses all war-making powers of the United States. Those powers 
not specifically falling within the “declare war?1 provision most assuredly were residual 
in the “grant letters of marque and reprisal” clause. U.S. C o n s t , art. I ,  § 8 , cl. 11.
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to initiate war is the presidential prerogative to use military force to 
repel sudden attack upon the United States54 and, after the War Powers 
Amendment, upon its forces.55 James Madison and Elbridge Gerry made 
joint motion to change Congress’s power from make war (the original 
wording of the clause as proposed by the Committee on Detail) to declare 
war, for the purpose as recorded by the notes of the convention kept by 
Madison, of “ leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden at­
tacks.”  56 Congress’s war powers also extend to the circumstances of war’s 
termination.67
As Commander-in-Chief, the President has substantial though not un­
limited power to direct a war once it has been initiated by Congress. 
Hamilton, the powerful advocate of presidential prerogatives, outlined the 
limits of the President’s power as Commander-in-Chief in The Federalist 
Papers:
The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy 
of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally 
the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much 
inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme com­
mand and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General 
and admiral of the Confederacy; while that of the British king extends
See Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 
Y ale  L.J. 672, 696 (1972).
Thomas Jefferson, as Secretary of State, analyzed the "undeclared war” element 
of reprisal:
[A] reprisal on a nation is a very serious thing. . , . [W]hen reprisal follows, 
it is considered an act .of war, and never failed to produce it in the case of a 
nation able to make war; besides, if the case were important and ripe for that 
step, Congress must be called upon to take it; the right of reprisal being ex­
pressly lodged with them by the Constitution, and not with the Executive.
Quoted in 7 I n t e r n a t i o n a l  L a w  D i g e s t  § 1095, at 123 (J. Moore ed. 1906) (em­
phasis added).
Pierce Butler, a Convention delegate from South Carolina, stated:
It is improbable that a single member of the Convention have signed his 
name to the Constitution if he had supposed that the instrument might be 
construed as authorizing the President to initiate a war, either general or 
partial, without the express authorization of Congress.
Quoted in Fulbright, Congress, the President and the War Power, 25 A r k . L. R e v . 71, 
74 (1971). Early cases decided by the Supreme Court also left little doubt about the 
power of Congress over both “declared”  and “undeclared” wars. The word “war” 
was not confined to mean only general (“declared” ) war. The Supreme Court 
furthermore found that the President must abide by the limitations set by Congress. 
Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 170 (1804); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch.) 1 (1801); Bas v. Tingy, 4U.S. (4DalL) 36 (1800).
“ The records of the constitutional convention leave little doubt that it was the 
intent of the Framers to provide an exception to the congressional war powers enabling 
the President to repel sudden attacks upon the United States. “ M r .  M a d i s o n  and 
Mr. G e r r y  moved to insert *declare/ striking out ‘make1 war; leaving to the Executive 
the power to repel sudden attacks.”  Van Alstyne, supra note 34, at 6, quoting 2 
R e c o r d s  o f  t h e  F e d e r a l  C o n v e n t i o n  o f  1789, at 318-19 (M. Farrand ed. 1911). 
H S. 440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1973), provides:
To repel an armed attack against the Armed Forces of the United States 
located outside of the United States, its territories and possessions, and to 
forestall the direct and imminent threat of such an attack.
See 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1541-48 (Supp. 1974).
w Van Alstyne, supra note 3 4 , at 6 , quoting 2  R e c o r d s  o f  t h e  F e d e r a l  C o n ­
v e n t i o n  o f  1789 (M, Farrand ed. 1911).
w Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948).
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to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and 
armies, — all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would 
appertain to the legislature.38
The President, possessing no power to initiate or wage executive war other 
than the power to repel sudden attacks, has been further limited by Con­
gress in his exercise of the powers of Commander-in-Chief.59 Congress 
has statutorily circumscribed presidential prerogatives to use troops for 
particular purposes and in certain areas of the world.60 He may not raise 
armies without congressional authorization,61 nor may he violate the Laws 
of War as determined by Congress.62 Congress’s power to issue letters of 
marque and reprisal, coupled with the original understanding of congress­
ional power to declare war, should mean that Congress has complete 
power over the commencement of war, whether declared or undeclared 
( “ imperfect” ) .63 The vast majority of Executive wars cited64 as precedents 
for the legality of the Executive origin of the Vietnam War based upon 
Commander-in-Chief powers of the President are distinguishable on their 
face as minor events, often involving the landing of troops to protect 
American civilians abroad.63 The only valid precedent for the constitu­
tional prerogative of the President to initiate war, though clearly distin­
83T h e  F e d e r a l i s t  No. 69, at 448 (Modern Library ed. 1937) (A. Hamilton).
ra See Wormuth, supra note 34, at 652 et seq.
60 Id. at 639—40. Congressional acts have regulated or forbidden the use of troops 
to accomplish the return of fugitive slaves and have forbidden the use of troops at 
polling places and as posse comitatus, or marines on shore. Other acts have provided 
for selective service and training limitations, and termination of activities in Indo­
china.
61 Id. at 642. For example, Abraham Lincoln’s use of volunteers at the beginning 
of the Civil War was dependent upon subsequent congressional legislation. United
States v. Hosmer, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 432 (1870).
63 Wormuth, supra note 34, at 645.
63 Lofgren, supra note 34, at 699—700. Lofgren concludes:
Since the old Congress held blanket power to “determine” on war, and since 
undeclared war was hardly unknown in fact and theory in the late eighteenth 
century, it therefore seems a reasonable conclusion that the new Congress’ 
power “to declare War”  was not understood in a narrow technical sense but 
rather as meaning the power to commence war, whether declared or not. To 
the extent that the power was more narrowly interpreted, however, the 
new Congress’ control over letters of marque and reprisal must have sug­
gested to contemporaries that it would still control “imperfect” —  that is, 
undeclared —  war.
Id.
64117 C o n g . Rec. 11,913-24 (1971) (remarks of Senator Goldwater); Goldwater, 
The President’s Constitutional Primacy in Foreign Relations and National Defense, 13 
V a  J. I n t ’ l  L .  463 (1973); Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers 
Act, 50 Tex L . Rev. 833 (1972).
63 Of the 137 cases of Executive action claimed by the State Department, forty- 
eight had clear congressional authorization, one was in self-defense, six were mere 
demonstrations, some others were trespass or spontaneous, unsanctioned acts by lower 
commanders, and several were clearly unconstitutional acts by the President. Wormuth, 
supra note 34, at 660 et. seq. “Even were these incidents to be regarded as equivalent 
to executive waging of war, the last precedent would stand no better than the first; 
illegality is not legitimized by repetition.” Berger, War-Making by the President, 121 
U. P a . L . R e v . 29, 60 (1972).
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guishable in terms of international law,66 is the Korean War. In that 
regard, it must simply be affirmed that violation by a President of a dear 
and exclusive textual grant of authority to Congress must not be taken to 
legitimate similar subsequent violations.67
The Tonkin Gulf Resolution, though not a congressional authorization 
for war,68 may reasonably be interpreted as an attempt by Congress to 
delegate its war powers to the President69 and directly to authorize his 
acts in the nature of reprisals.70 Even though the Supreme Court has not 
stricken a delegation of congressional powers to the Executive since the 
1930’s,71 the specificity of the textual grant of the war power to Congress, 
together with its profound impact upon the entire conception of separation 
of powers, suggests that delegation of such powers should not be tolerated. 
In any event, whatever authority the President derived from the Tonkin 
Gulf Resolution was terminated with its repeal in 1971. At least after that 
time, the United States fought an unconstitutional war in Southeast Asia.
It seems clear that the war powers cannot be delegated by treaty, specifi­
cally by the provisions of the Southeast Asian Treaty,72 without participa­
m Within the context of international law, two highly significant factors distinguish 
our participation in the Korean War from our role in Vietnam. First, the United 
Nations by Security Council resolution had determined the existence of an armed 
attack by the forces of North Korea upon South Korea. The resolution called upon all 
member states to provide military forces under a unified United Nations command to 
repel the attack. 5 U.N. SCOR, 476th meeting 5, U.N. Doc S/1588 (1950). Second, 
the massive, completely unambiguous nature of die armed attack verified by United 
Nations fact-finding at the time of the assault, contrasts sharply with the indirect 
aggression that characterized the early years of the Vietnam War. See Firmage, Fact­
Finding in the Resolution of International Disputes —  From the Hague Peace Con­
ference to the United Nations, 1971 U t a h  L. R e v . 421,445-46.
a Many writers who are critical of the several lists of “Executive wars” because of 
the insignificance of the examples set forth find little problem in accepting the Korean 
conflict and the Vietnam action as examples of “Executive wars.” The Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee has issued a statement that “only since 1950 have Presidents re­
garded themselves as having authority to commit the aimed forces to full scale and 
sustained warfare.” S. R e p . No, 707, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1967).
President Johnson, in much the same way as President Truman handled the Security 
Council resolution, did not place primary legal reliance upon the Tonkin Gulf Resolu­
tion. Instead, he repeatedly asserted a constitutional, presidential power to conduct war 
in Southeast-Asia,
03 Wormuth finds four differences between the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and initiation 
of war by Congress: (1) The Resolution did not initiate hostilities, but only authorized 
the President to do so; (2) The Resolution did not define our legal status, i.e., general 
or limjtprl war; (3) The Resolution defined no adversary state; and (4) No treaty of 
peace requiring Senate concurrence was demanded; accordingly, the President could 
freely conclude a peace as well as authorize a war. ^Wormuth concludes that since the 
Tonkin Gulf Resolution performed none of the functions of a declared war, it could not 
operate as a declaration of war. It was an outright presentation of the war power to 
the President and, as such, was an unconstitutional delegation of congressional power. 
Wormuth, supra note 34, at 691-92. See also Van Alstyne, supra note 34, at 20.
Wormuth, supra note 34, at 692.
10 See Tonkin Gulf Resolution, H.R.J. Res. 1145, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 78 Stat. 384 
(1964), wherein the President is authorized to repel an attack against United States 
forces and to “prevent further aggression.”
71 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Re­
fining Co. v. Ryan, 292 U.S. 388 (1935).
71 See Firmage, International Law and the Response of the United States to 
“ Internal W ar" in 2 T h e  V i e t n a m  W a r  a n d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  L a w  89, 116-17 (R. 
FaJk ej .  1969). Article four, paragraph one, of the Southeast Asia Collective defense 
Treaty (SEATO) states:
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tion by the House of Representatives in the treaty-making process.73 
SEATO requires that its member states act only “ in accordance with 
[their] constitutional process.”  74 The President must not be allowed the 
ultimate bootstrap of initiating an international agreement (SEATO), 
claiming the constitutional mandate to see “that the laws be faithfully 
executed/’ 75 and then waging a war —  otherwise proscribed by the Con­
stitution •— upon the argument that it is required by the international 
agreement. Neither presidential power to initiate war nor congressional 
authority to delegate its war powers can be accomplished by international 
agreement contrary to constitutional restraints. In Reid v. Covert, the 
Supreme Court stated that
no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on Congress, 
or on any other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints 
of the Constitution.
. . .  It would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those who 
created the Constitution [and] alien to our entire constitutional history 
and tradition . . .  to construe Article VI as permitting the United States 
to exercise power under an international agreement without observing 
constitutional prohibitions.76
Covert mercifully lays to rest the question whether the power to make 
international agreements somehow releases the federal government from 
constitutional constraints, a question raised in part by a broad reading 
of Missouri v. Holland77 and in part by Mr. Justice Sutherland’s tortured 
history of the origin of national power to conduct foreign policy.78
Each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty 
area against any of the parties or against any state or territory which the 
parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its 
own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the 
common danger (1955) in accordance with its constitutional processes.
6 U.S.T. 81, T.I.A.S. No. 3170, reprinted in 60 A m . J. I n t ’ l  L. 647 (1966) (emphasis 
added).
[T]he treaty commitment, rather than empowering the President to undertake 
the use of military force, sets an international contractual obligation — 
obliging Congress to make the declaration of war if it intends to fulfill the 
treaty commitment.
Van Alstyne, supra note 34, at 14.
”  The Constitution vests the war powers in both Houses of Congress, and not 
in the President and the Senate, as with the treaty power. The alternative —  grant­
ing to the President the power to initiate war with Senate concurrence —  was specifically 
considered and rejected at the Convention. See 1 R e c o r d s  o f  t h e  F e d e r a l  C o n v e n ­
t i o n  o f  1787, at 292, 300 (M. Farrand ed. 1911).
"SEATO Treaty, art. 4, If 4, 6 U.S.T. 81, T.I.A.S. No. 3170, reprinted in 60 
A m . J. I n t ’ l  L. 647 (1966).
™ U.S. C o n s t , a rt . II, § 3.
18 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957).
"252 U.S. 416 (1920).
18 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). According 
to Mr. Justice Sutherland, power to conduct foreign policy was somehow transferred 
directly from the Crown to the federal government and does not inhere to the federal 
government through grant from the Constitutional Convention. Justice Sutherland 
wrote for the Court: “As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the colonies 
acting as a unit, the powers of external sovereignty passed from the Crown not to the 
colonies severally, but to the colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the
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The constitutional mandate that the “ executive power shall be vestecl”  79 
in the President is not a grant of inherent power, much less an executive 
authorization to do all things “necessary and proper” to accomplish dele­
gated prerogatives. Rather, it is simply the power ministerially to execute 
laws enacted by Congress. The President’s constitutional mandate to 
execute the laws in no way authorizes the President to perform the legisla­
tive task of creating the laws to be executed. When considered in the con­
text of the war power, the President’s executive power does not in any way 
increase his enumerated power as "Commander-in-Chief.”  This is the 
meaning of the Steel Seizure and New York Times cases.80 An acknowl­
edgment of inherent presidential power would constitute a giant stride 
toward eliminating the distinction between republican government and 
imperial presidency.
Finally, it is quite proper that foreign affairs remain dominantly the 
domain of the political branches of government. Foreign affairs has con­
stituted the “hard core”  of the political question doctrine from the begin­
ning. Even so, the courts have often spoken on vital issues of foreign 
policy.81 As the communal roots of a society deepen and the community 
matures, it would seem reasonable that decisions could increasingly be 
made more in accordance with rules of law and somewhat less by political 
accommodation. Accordingly, one might expect to see a gradual but 
steady constriction of the scope of the political question doctrine. But 
where the Constitution accomplishes a clear textual grant of power to one 
political branch, it would seem entirely proper for the Court to reject the 
political question argument and reach the merits of a controversy. Under 
Baker v. Carr?2 a “ textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of 
the issue to a coordinate political department”  qualifies as a political ques­
tion. However, the branch to which such power has been granted must 
stay within its constitutional mandate; whether a branch exceeds such 
mandate is justiciable, according to Powell v. McCormack.83 Whether we 
should be at war at a given time, with whom, and for what reason are 
political questions rightly reserved to the political branches. But the issue
United States of America.”  Id. zX 3 1 6 ;  see Lofgren, United States v, Curtiss-Wright 
Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 8 3  Y a l e  L.J. 1 ( 1 9 7 3 ) ;  Wormuth, 
supra note 3 4 , at 6 9 4 .
w U.S. C o n s t , art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
“  See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
81 In keeping with the intentions of the framers, the Court has held that the 
President may repel a sudden attack, whether by invasion or by insurrection, 
that Congress may institute either general or limited war, and that the Presi­
dent in waging war may not exceed his statutory authority. The rank, status, 
duties, and discipline of members of the armed forces are fixed by Congress.
The recruitment of the armed forces, the draft, the confiscation of enemy 
property, the appropriation of factories, the suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus —  all these and other topics have been adjudicated and held to belong 
to Congress. _
Wormuth, supra note 34, at 678—79 (footnotes omitted).
a  369 U.S. 186 (1962).
83 396 U.S. 486, 514 (1969). See also Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
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whether war was initiated in accordance with the Constitution’s clear 
textual mandate to Congress is justiciable and should be decided by the 
Court.84
The concept of separated powers, properly checked and balanced, has 
too long been allowed to atrophy because of a tilt toward the Executive 
branch. This trend, too frequently advanced by Executive action during 
times of war, must be reversed, and a condition of equilibrium reestab­
lished. Perhaps the causally related shocks of Vietnam and Watergate will 
generate currents of opinion sufficiently strong and enduring to facilitate 
institutional reform capable of returning us to old moorings.85
In addition to the constitutional constraints upon Executive action, 
extra-constitutional constraints must be preserved and in some cases 
revitalized. Although these concepts cannot be developed here, such 
constraints upon arbitrary presidential action include a strong political 
party structure to which the President would in some degree be ac­
countable; a White House staff with seniors committed to republican 
government and the mile of law and juniors sufficiently beyond identity 
crises to avoid seduction; a Cabinet composed of members of sufficient 
independent political or professional base to allow private if not public 
dissent from presidential policies; and a presidential schedule that would 
allow leading politicians of both parties access to the presidential ear. 
Finally, a free press, though not formally a part of the system of checks
81 In 1821, Chief Justice Marshall, in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264 
(1821), stated:
It is most true, that this court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: 
but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction, if it should. The judiciary 
cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure, because it approaches the 
confines of the constitution. . . . With whatever doubts, with whatever diffi­
culties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before 
us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is 
given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would 
be treason to the constitution.
Id. at 404.
The abstention and political question doctrines are exceptions to Marshall’s dictum, 
and perhaps rightly so. But the goal recognized in the statement remains valid, parti­
cularly as it relates to the question of a clear textual grant of power to one branch 
of government that is usurped by another without the necessity of a struggle.
See also Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970) (Harlan & Stewart, J.J., 
dissenting); Hart v. United States, 391 U.S. 956 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting); 
Holmes v. United States, 391 U.S. 936 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Mora v. Mc­
Namara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967) (Stewart & Douglas, J.J., dissenting); Orlando v. 
Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971) (court found a 
justiciable question and reached the merits of the case concerning United States 
military activity in Vietnam).
8SGeorge Washington said: _
The necessity of reciprocal checks of political power . . . has been evinced.. . .
To preserve them must be as necessary as to institute them. If in the opinion 
of the people, the distribution or modification of the Constitutional powers 
be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way 
in which the Constitution designates. But let there be no change by usurpa­
tion; for though this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the 
customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. The precedent 
must always greatly overbalance in permanent evil any partial or transient 
benefit which the use can at any time yield.
3 5  G. W a s h i n g t o n ,  W r it i n g s  2 2 8 - 2 9  (Fitzpatrick e d . 1 9 4 0 ) .
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and balances, provides the life fluid —  from a position shielded by the first 
amendment —  without which the entire constitutional structure would be 
impotent. A  conditional privilege for newsmen’s sources of information is 
essential.
B. International Law and Vietnam
The existence of nuclear weapons has made massive warfare between 
nuclear-weapon states highly unlikely and has also precipitated increas­
ingly strong customary legal constraints upon such forms of warfare. 
Similarly, the trauma of the Vietnam War, by force of its ghastly impact 
upon all participants, may affect certain international rules of behavior. 
The norms most likely to be affected are those governing the conditions 
under which nations go to war and the means by which war is fought.
Within the traditional norm 86 governing third party participation in 
civil strife, third parties could aid the incumbent government at least 
initially, they could not aid the insurgent faction at least until a status of 
belligerency was attained, and they were required to be neutral after such 
status was attained; this norm has been seriously undercut. A  fundamental 
justification for a rule favoring the incumbent has been the accuracy of 
perceiving the valued roles performed by the incumbent in society. Thus, 
a legal presumption favoring the incumbent was defensible because its very 
existence strongly suggested its legitimacy. The term “legitimacy”  is not 
used here in the legalistic sense of the acquisition of power by formally 
orthodox or proper means; rather, it is used, as the political scientist or 
sociologist would use it, to connote a sufficient affinity between the peo­
ple and the institutions of government, based upon the preexistence of a 
cultural harmony between them, that allegiance naturally results without 
coercion.87 Because of this affinity between the people and their govern­
ment, the government could perform essential functions such as the main­
tenance of order, the collection of taxes, and the performance of other 
basic tasks. In those parts of the so-called Third World that have experi­
enced colonial rule, the emergence of governing elites possessing the 
characteristics of political legitimacy has not occurred immediately, nor has 
it always taken the direction preferred by the former colonial ruler. Often, 
several factions have contended for dominance, or former colonial rulers 
have attempted to impose their choice for native leadership upon the 
society.
The result has been a blurred distinction between incumbent and in­
surgent. Most incumbents have lacked many if not all of the traditional 
characteristics of incumbency. In such a situation the underpinnings of the
“  See Firmage, Summary and Interpretation, in T h e  I n t e r n a t io n a l  L a w  o f  
C iv il  W a r  405 (R .  Falk ed. 1970).
s: See Firmage, The War of National Liberation and the Third World, in L a w  a n d  
C iv il  W a r  i n  T h e  M o d e r n  W o r l d  (Moore ed, 1974). Lipset has defined legitimacy 
as the capacity of a political system to advance and maintain the belief that existing 
political institutions were the most appropriate for the community. Lipset, Some Social 
Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy 53 Am. 
P o l . Sc i . R e v . 69 (1959).
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traditional rule, with its presumption of incumbent legitimacy, have 
been largely destroyed. The traditional rule cannot survive in those areas 
with a colonial past, at least until traditional elites emerge possessing 
sufficient legitimacy to govern.
It follows that a new norm governing third party involvement will 
develop; that rule will either allow unrestricted military aid to both in­
cumbent and insurgent without distinction, or it will proscribe military 
assistance to any faction in a state experiencing civil strife, or it will allow 
some forms of aid under restrictions falling somewhere between the two 
pole positions. The first possibility would permit unrestrained intervention 
and is best described as the absence of a norm rather than the creation of 
a new one. The second possibility, proscribing any form of third party 
military aid, would probably be at once the most desirable and the least 
likely of accomplishment. Modified versions of this norm, sufficiently 
realistic to be acceptable to most powerful states, have been suggested 
and analyzed by Farer and Moore.88 Our experience in Vietnam clearly 
demonstrates the illegality, the immorality, and the hopelessness of inter­
vention in support of an incumbent regime that lacks sufficient legitimacy 
to govern without outside assistance.
World-wide offense at American participation in the Vietnam War 
stemmed not only from the perceived illegitimacy of our intervention, but 
also from the strategy and the weaponry employed, A clear absence of 
proportionality existed from the beginning; it was made apparent to the 
world because of television, and it was made more damning upon release 
of the Pentagon Papers, which revealed no serious debate on the moral 
and legal questions involved in waging modem war against a native 
society. A strategy necessitating free-fire zones, forced depopulation of 
major areas, carpet bombing, bombing of major urban areas, and use of 
the most sophisticated weaponry with massive firepower obliterates any 
distinction between combatant and non-combatant. The moral and legal 
consequences resulting from the needless deaths of hundreds of thousands 
of people should be enough to deter other states from similar conduct. But 
if this is not enough, the spectacle of our political fabric being more seri­
ously rent by our involvement in Vietnam (followed both chronologically 
and causally by Watergate) than by any other event since the Civil War 
should give pause to states considering similar policies of intervention into 
post-colonial wars of separation and revolution.
III. C o n c lu s io n
The end of American participation in the Vietnamese war, rapproche­
ment with the Soviet Union, and normalization of relations with China 
effectively conclude the ideological binge that the world has enjoyed since
83 Farer, Harnessing Rogue Elephants: A Short Discourse on Intervention in Civil 
Strife, in 2 T h e  V ie t n a m  W a r  a n d  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  L a w  1089 (R. Falk ed. 1969); 
M o o re , The Control of Foreign Intervention in International Conflict, 9 V a . J. I n t ’ l  L. 
205 (1969).
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the political fossilization of the military conclusion of World War II. 
Traditional balance of power politics can now be indulged with, more 
actors than two. This condition represents a giant step forward from that 
of the Cold War. In many respects, however, this places us back on 
square one —  circa 1918 or perhaps 1945 —  with the alternative of at­
tempting in perpetuity a balance of power sufficient to ensure the peace 
or, in recognition of the inherent instability of such a system, attempting a 
deepened international community sufficient to support legitimate institu­
tions for cooperation and dispute resolution. Law can contribute to the 
deepening of international community to the extent that it is acknowledged 
to be more than the superstructure of community and actually part of its 
warp and woof.
Reactionary foreign policy could result from two conditions. First, an 
attempt to return simply to the politics of classic balance of power, without 
recognizing the need for an increased role for institutions of law, would 
represent a tragic waste of this foreign policy watershed. Kissinger and 
Kennan can no more hope to control perpetually the multiple variables 
in such a system of inherent instability than could Mettemich and Bis- 
mark. Second, premature or unjustified reliance upon legal institutions 
could result in a disillusioned reaction against them and could cause total 
reliance upon geopolitics and force.
To reiterate, international order can be furthered by introjecting legal 
constraints on decisional processes in four suggested areas. First, the degree 
to which a government adheres to its own legal constraints, constitutional 
or otherwise, bears directly on international peace. Second, the degree to 
which a government’s decisional processes adhere to international legal con­
straints also affects international order. Third, the extent to which a 
government promotes and sustains international institutions contributes to 
international order. And fourth, the level of legal consciousness that the 
world public has realized acts as a real constraint on governments that 
would otherwise act in disruption of international order.
In earlier times, when men were perhaps closer to the truth than later 
generations may care to admit, sovereign discretion was considered to be 
limited by four levels of law: the laws of God; the laws of nature; leges 
imperii, or the laws of government —  in our day, constitutional law; and 
finally, laws common to all nations, or international law. Today we ac­
complish the first by a well publicized prayer breakfast, deny the existence 
of the second, ravage the third by claiming our own past violations as 
precedent for continued violations, and use the fourth to rationalize a 
course of conduct determined largely by other motives. The first contri­
bution of law to the accomplishment of peace might well consist of an 
attempt to control our own illegal predilections toward violence, recogniz­
ing that in recent years we have been among the major contributors to 
a violent world. An “ Athenian stranger”  observed hundreds of years ago 
that “ the state in which the law is above the rulers, and the rulers are 
the inferiors of the law, has salvation, and every blessing which the gods
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can confer.”  89 If we were to achieve that happy condition, we would at 
once eliminate much violence now caused by our own illegal acts, and 
perhaps we would then be in the position to deserve and receive the 
emulation of others.
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80 P l a t o , L a w s  B k . I ll  (J.M. Dent Trans. 1934).
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